Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.aiub.edu:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/2994
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dc.contributor.authorKhan, Mohammad Zahidul Islam-
dc.date.accessioned2026-09-16T13:25:17Z-
dc.date.available2026-09-16T13:25:17Z-
dc.date.issued2025-06-30-
dc.identifier.citationGroup Captain Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan, acsc, psc, PhD (Retired). (2025). STRANGE PAUSE AFTER A DECISIVE VICTORY: REVISITING THE GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION OF NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE DURING BANGLADESH’S LIBERATION WAR. NDC E-JOURNAL, 5(1), 173-202. Retrieved from https://ndcjournal.ndc.gov.bd/ndcj/index.php/ndcj/article/view/412en_US
dc.identifier.issnE-ISSN: 2709-9016-
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.aiub.edu:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/2994-
dc.description.abstractThe coordinated offensive of 21 November 1971 marked India’s first overt military intervention inside the East Pakistan, in support of the ongoing Liberation War of Bangladesh. Following the November offensive, Bangladeshi forces intensified their fight against Pakistani forces; however, India took a ‘strange’ pause till 03 December. This article explores the geopolitical significance of the November Offensive. It explains why India took the odd pause, how Pakistan reacted to it, and how significant was the November offensive from Bangladesh’s perspective. Exploring the archival records of the United Nations, Indian Lok Sabaha and Bangladesh Liberation War, the article argues that India opted for the odd pause to secure international legitimacy and relegated her November offensive in the East as an insignificant prelude. Pakistan’s reaction-a pre-emptive air strike on Indian airfields in the Western Sector-transformed the Liberation War into an Indo-Pak war and exposed her as an initiator and aggressor. Unlike India, the November offensive was not a ‘prelude’ for Bangladesh but a continuation of the war and a merger of the two Forces; it exposed the wartime government to the geopolitics of an internationalised civil war. Consequently, the first Operational Directive issued by the Commander-in-Chief of Bangladesh Forces on 22 November, placed the two Forces under a unified command and, more importantly, lending a layer of legitimacy for both Forces while retaining the political authority and ownership of the War. Bangladesh and India were guided by geopolitical considerations-exemplifying Clausewitz’s maxim that war is an instrument of (geo)politics by other means.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherNational Defence College Journal - Bangladeshen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVol. 5 No. 1;June 2025-
dc.subject1971 Liberation Waren_US
dc.subjectArmed Force Dayen_US
dc.subjectGeopoliticsen_US
dc.subjectIndo-Pak Waren_US
dc.subjectInternationalised Civil Waren_US
dc.subjectStrategic Paus,en_US
dc.subjectUnited Nationsen_US
dc.subjectBangladeshen_US
dc.titleSTRANGE PAUSE AFTER A DECISIVE VICTORY: REVISITING THE GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION OF NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE DURING BANGLADESH’S LIBERATION WARen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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